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Abstract
Many modern strands of thought since Wittgenstein have turned traditional western phi-
losophy "against itself", so to speak. Continuing this intriguing impulse to study language,
not as a transparent and neutral medium of thought, but as an integral part of human
beingness, this article introduces a model whereby human existence can be considered
within three conjoined spheres, configured by and expressed through language use. These
are the anarchic, civil and structural spheres. The inspiration for this did not merely come
from Wittgenstein. Instead it developed just as much from philosophical studies and physico-
meditative practices within the Chinese tradition. Therefore, it is an expression of inter-
civilizational dialogics and requires the patience and curiosity of the reader. Traditional Chi-
nese ideation built on three relations to language, here symbolised by qi, Ii and fa. In each
life, these involve a cycle of skills to be mastered.
Introduction
This paper presents human existence in three spheres expressed as separate levels of
language use. The adopted approach is holistic in that it tries by definition to encompass all
conceivable language use, and thus invites further development and categorisation by the
reader. The assumptions and aims involved are meant to stimulate further thought more
than argue a case. First, language use is perceived as a collection of separate skills. Sec-
ond, these skills relate to each other in an ascending fashion. Third, most individuals master
the skills to significantly differing degrees. And fourth, language is seen to be external to
man despite man possessing an inherent ability to use language. In that sense, relativism is
the essence of language. Given this way of thought, whatever absolute values we seek
must be sought outside language.
I postulate that language ability, meaning both habits of expression and techniques of thought,
can be divided into three basically different language skills. A skill is defined as an ability
that requires time and opportunity to master, and although it might become second nature to
us, it must nevertheless be maintained. Thus, when one exercises (does one's exercise;
trains), or when one exercises (one's ability), the same term is used: one is training one's
skill, or one is putting one's ability to use.
To a question about someone's language ability of the type "How good is X in English?" one
would normally answer either that X is orally fluent, meaning that he/she uses phrases
easily and rather spontaneously and seems conscious of the fluidity of contexts, or one may
say that he reads well or writes interestingly, or not, as the case may be, or that X, though
obviously a native speaker, has a poor vocabulary. Or one may most probably state a com-
bination of the above. The simple question is obviously too simple, since no simple answer
can be given. In fact, it errs in assuming that X is either good at a language or he/she is not.
We need therefore to deconstruct the matter, as it were. Mastery of language appears to be
a more complicated process than one is led to assume, given the general understanding
that the human faculty for language is as naturally given as breathing is. Indeed, the com-
parison can be extended: the process of breathing is developed quite differently among
different people. We have thus every reason to see language use more as a complex skill
than a naturally given gift of expression.
---------------------tt~-------------------
r
3L Journal of Language Teaching, Linguistics and Literature
I conceive of language mastery as the attainment of three separate skills. I thus call my
model the Three Levels of Language Use. I shall first present the general line of thought and
then discuss its possible consequences. Furthermore, varying tensions between the three
levels can help describe relationships between philosophical and ideological trends within a
single cultural tradition. My cleaving method is the following. First, I separate written lan-
guage from spoken language. The phenomenon of script introduces aspects into language,
which essentially changes it into a much more complex thing capable of enormous applica-
bility, and capable of generating creative (and illusory) thought. Benedict Anderson's influ-
ential book Imagined Communities, for example, argues convincingly about the decisive
importance of printing to modern nationalism (Anderson, 1983).
The next step is to divide spoken language into two: civil language and individual language.
Two relevant points to be made at this stage about the learning of language are: First, we
learn spoken language before we take on written language, and second, the socialisation of
the individual child is essentially different from its expressiveness as a living organism, even
if socialisation structures and makes that expressiveness potentially communicative. How-
ever, after the socialisation of this original expressiveness, this communicativeness must
still be understood as a phenomenon separate from the organism's expressiveness
(Wittgenstein, 1953 §244). This in no way supposes a private language, a notion Ludwig
Wittgenstein has shown to be erroneous (see Wittgenstein 1953, §243 ff.). A private lan-
guage seeks to communicate, while this expressiveness does not. In fact, I suggest it is
when language behaviour, which is communicative, is confused with expressiveness which
has a potentially communicative form that one entertains the notion of private language.**
What I am instead denoted here is the individual being's expressive behaviour that, though
potentially communicative or comprehensible, is largely unidirectional and willful in the pri-
mal sense. An audience may not necessarily be needed despite the expression's social
potential. This is the First Level of Language Use, which I title The Anarchic Level. An
alternative term would be The Existential Level. Singing would be an activity that characterises
well what I am defining here. Shouting for the sake of shouting would be another such
behaviour, having somewhat the same status as the behaviour of a cat stretching itself.
The Second Level of Language Use involves the socialisation process and subsequent
complex conventions, rituals, roles and ceremonies. Here, society at large makes itself
evident, and immediate communicativeness between two parties is the main criterion. I
name this The Civil Level. We are dealing with the language of social intercourse in a
narrow and situational sense here. Language fulfils its role as a central aspect of social
behaviour. There are however different levels of what we classify as social behaviour. While
it may be true, as Fairclough (1989, p.23) points out that "linguistic phenomena are social
phenomena of a special sort, and social phenomena are (in part) linguistic phenomena",
especially when the term "social" is used very broadly, essential social differences do exist
to configure linguistic phenomena. The above-mentioned Anarchic Level involves social
aspects to the extent that what I would call "primal" behaviour has adopted linguistic· forms
with social origins, and furthermore, there is always a potential social significance involved
in that a response from the social surrounding can be expected. The Civil Level deals with
linguistic phenomena that are either situationally communicative or ritualistic.
**Wittgenstein's argument, as summarised by Saul A. Kripke, states: To the extent that I rely on my
own impressions or memories of what I meant by various sensation signs for support, I have no way of
quelling these doubts. Only others, who recognize the correctness of my identification through my
external behaviour, can provide an appropriate check (Kripke,1982, p. 60).
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Through man's invention of the written language, many sciences became possible: Logic,
Mathematics, the Natural Sciences, Law, and Linguistics, just to name a few of the major
ones. Incidentally, the ancient Chinese term for script, wen, also meant culture/civilisation.
Expressions and thoughts based on, and sustaining, the regularity and relative
unchangeability allowed by written language are phenomena of The Structural Level. Gram-
mar, which at the civil level would be descriptive, becomes normative at this higher level. It
becomes its own goal. The "sociality" of linguistic phenomena at this level differs from the
two lower levels in that they are results of generative language processes previously
formalised. They are in short "applications" of methods of thought, characterised by cat-
egorical thought and by the lack of social spontaneity. This may be grammatical, logical or
mathematical.
Schematically, my line of thought can be depicted thus:
Written
Language
Spoken
Language
Speculations
Anarchic Level
Structural Level
Civil Level
The
Individual
The
Collective
Impressions
Model 1: The Three Levels of Language Use
In a concrete case, it might not always be immediately obvious which level a linguistic utter-
ance belongs to. However, if enough consideration is given to the conditions prevailing
during its use, most ambiguous cases can be properly identified. The three levels can again
be sorted into The Sphere of the Individual in contradistinction to The Sphere to the Collec-
tive that in its turn is made up of the Structural and the Civil levels.
------------------------------~~~-----------------------------
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If a mother says to a child, "Don't do that, Ahmad," the level in question is quite clear. The
mother, as an individual, is trying to stop an action she disapproves of. The child will have to
deal with her as an individual if he disobeys. But if she were instead to say something
deceptively similar like "It is not right to do that, Ahmad," she would, although still seeking a
superficially similar result as in the first case, no longer be speaking merely as an individual,
but more as an advocate of some rule belonging to a higher level of language use. She
applies, and in the process teaches, a rule in the latter instance, while in the former in-
stance, she was merely expressing a personal displeasure at an impending state of affairs.
She is, in the latter case, referring to an authority from The Collective Level. If the "right" she
refers to is of an ethical nature - a rule of acceptable daily conduct - then she is propagating
a rule from the Civil Level. But if she is referring to a legal ruling, then the higher authority
called upon is from the Structural Level. Of course, in the former instance, after saying
"Don't do that, Ahmad," she may continue with "someone might see you". This would reveal
to the child that its mother does not place her whole authority behind the admonition, but is
to an extent only transferring a regulation belonging to an external power. In all events, the
context decides at which level a linguistic event occurs.
Rules of behaviour, given their specific purposes, are presumably formulated comprehen-
sively for maximal acceptability, communicability and, most of all, applicability. We see that
on the Collective Level, there are two ways in which this can be fulfilled. At the Structural
Level, there are laws, understood as judicial, mathematical or natural, written down as con-
sistently and as mutually compatibly as possible. Unacceptable and deviant acts are
recognised as different forms of felonies and misdemeanours. At the Civil Level, rules of
conduct are passed on, or down, not through the written word, but as maxims and principles
that live on through word of mouth and through regular behaviour observed, sanctioned and
imitated. Language use at the Anarchic Level expresses the living organism's spontaneity.
The stability of textual regulatory practices relies strongly on continuity in authoritative inter-
pretation, and on literacy. We are here decidedly not merely considering laws of a jl:Jdicial or
an obviously contractual nature but even rules of logic and mathematics, which are widely
considered naturally given structures. In short, all rules dependent on textualisation belong
to this category. Rules of conventions, on the other hand, are stable insofar as human
behaviour is habitual, although their propagation and practice tend to differ in line with sub-
jective differences and evolving contexts. Mastering the Structural Level of Language Use is
reflected, in short, in the ability to digitise and to deduce. Skills in Civil Level Language Use
involve practical knowledge of socially acceptable behaviour, and amount to the ability to
conduct social intercourse and to perform social rituals. Needless to say, this relies greatly
on sharing daily rituals and linguistic habits, on knowing the fears and favours of fellow
beings, and on understanding their thinking techniques and psychological tendencies, not
to mention more demanding discursive commonalities (Fairclough, 1989; Ooi, 2000).
The "order of discourse" (Foucault, 1986), the "meaning system" (Fairclough, 1989, pp. 93-
97), the "language game" (Wittgenstein, 1974,1953), or model, consisting of these three
levels of language use provides a means for analysis of a single general term in three
parallel contexts. General meanings will differ depending on which level the word is used at.
To take a quick example, "knowledge" understood at the Structural Level involves state-
ments made within natural and social sciences. However, language phenomena which do
not try to make regularities relevant, but which instead merely try to express and stimulate
individual experiences (Swedish: upplevelset'), like most poetry, make no claim to knowl-
edge. They do not strictly belong to the Structural Level even if they are in written form. Such
literature would be more correctly conceived as the written form of spoken language, so to
speak. When not positively making scientific or ethical claims, it can be considered anarchic
language in written form. When rhetorical in nature, it becomes a part of civil language.
Circulars of political speeches would often be examples of the latter.
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Where social acceptability is given consideration, anarchic language phenomena become
civil language phenomena. Individual language has been defined as the ability for sett-
expression, the self here understood as a physical living organism. The writing of a poem
merely to express experiences and for the sake of the activity itself is an instance of Lan-
guage Use of the Anarchic Level, while the incidental reading of that poem is a more or less
Civil Level phenomenon. The systematic discussion of the poem occurs at the Structural
Level.
In the same way, when I say Language Phenomena of the Structural Level, I do not merely
mean texts as such, but include even spoken statements that express thoughts that origi-
nate from, are made possible and are generated by, written language. A discussion in juris-
diction, logic, mathematics, though oral, will nevertheless belong to the third level as long as
the subjects involved playa decisive role. Musical phenomena make a good analogy here.
Music can be directly expressive of the musician, making it an anarchic experience; it can
be socially functional for creating modes, which makes it a civil level phenomenon; or it can
be a complex construction made possible through creative applications of rules of music,
which makes it an animal of the structural level.
Generally, going back to the first question posed in this paper, if someone is said to be good
in language, it would be presumptuous to think that it means that the person is generally
good in language. One can always imagine all sorts of context and language phenomena at
which he/she does not excel. More strictly put, the inquirer will be better served by an an-
swer that informs him/her about which levels of language use the queried person is trained
in, and which he/she is not well trained in, in that particular language.
Someone skilled at the Structural Level will be good at abstract thought, a necessary talent
in the realm of logic and mathematics. Someone good at the Civil Level will probably do well
in dialogue, possessing intuitive knowledge about behavioural habits and psychology. Some-
one well trained (more rightly, uncoerced) at the Individual Level of Language Use will not
only be rather unhampered in expressing his/her own feelings, but will more characteristi-
cally behave with immediacy and spontaneity. I venture that it is essentially at this basic
level that individual freedom is experienced and expressed. Freedom becomes not a formal
freedom but a skill in immediate expression that most of us had as children but have lost
through socialisation and education. Freedom at the Civil Level can be expressed in terms
of duties, while at the Structural Level, one may perhaps talk of rights.
At the Anarchic Level, all things happen with the physical subject as the most important
ingredient. Physical presence becomes less and less necessary as one ascends the Hier-
archy of Language Use. Subjectivity gives way to objectivity, particularity to generality, the
individual to the collective, the concrete to the abstract, anarchism to coercion.
Distinguishing Levels of Meaning
The aforementioned consequence of the division of language use into three essentially
separate abilities seems to offer conceptual space for understanding different terms.
Terms as commonly used as "Knowledge", "Freedom of Expression", even "Right and Wrong"
and "Justice" and "Fairness" can be shown to differ along the dimension of language use
presented here. "Knowledge" at the Third Level has to fulfill criteria of coherence, corre-
spondence or comprehensibility. At the Second Level, knowledge of propriety forms the
standard. At the first level, knowledge becomes the same thing as the act or the experienc-
ing itself. It is similar to the world of dreams in that social checks on the correctness of the
descriptions are redundant, or simply impossible. Incidentally, the Ming philosopher, Wang
•
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Yangming (1472-1529), who, in line with the Confucian tendency towards holistic thought,
and tempered by Chan (Zen) Buddhism's eagerness to dissolve abstractions, professed
that "Knowledge and Action are One" (zhixing he yt)(Wang, 1963, Part I). In effect, one
could say that Wang's activistic enlightenment resides in the individual who has succeeded
in integrating all three levels of language use. All the barriers between them are dismantled:
The enlightened individual is thus spontaneous, yet morally and logically rational at the
same time. Disciplined spontaneity might be a good term for describing this state of being.
One may see this existential evolution either as the attainment of a realisation that individu-
ality and collective identity are not separate entities, or as a total appropriation of one by the
other - a synthesis, as it were, of rationality, morality and physicality.
There is only one mind. Before it is mixed with selfish human desires, it is called the moral
mind, and after it is mixed with human desires contrary to its natural state, it is called the
human mind. When the human mind is rectified it is call the moral mind and when the moral
mind loses its correctness, it is called the human mind. There were not two minds to start
with (Wang, 1963, pp. 16-17).
Incidentally, it may prove informative at this point to consider the three levels of ethics found
in Foucault's later writings such as The History of Sexuality, Volume Two (French original
1984). Wang Yangming's way to enlightenment, which is generally concerned with the seam-
less integration of individual dignity and freedom with morally correct behaviour, is about the
journey of the mature adult struggling to solve the conflict between his adult (and adulter-
ated) opinions and the natural spontaneity of his physical being. A similar direction is as-
sumed in Foucault's construction. If we compare Foucault's levels with the three levels
presented in this article, and if we recognise the dynamics of development of Foucault's
system to be a movement in the opposite direction to mine, a circular motion becomes
apparent where a struggle against the belief that language is neutrally depictive takes place,
enhancing an existential movement from the mature to the primal from where one once
came. Foucault's levels consist of "moral codes" "moral behaviour" and "self-practices" (Fink-
Eitel, 1992, p. 69; Foucault, 1988). The first denotes prescriptions for how the individual is to
live, the second expresses the individual's level of integration into this system of codes, and
the third involves the individual's degree of her/his own experience of being a free agent. In
Wang Yangming's Idealistic School (Xinxue), the struggle ends in total victory for the indi-
vidual, with the inner tension finally dissolved.
"Right and Wrong" is not really applicable at the Anarchic Level since all language acts
there are per definition pre-social despite the fact that most forms of primal expression are
"Ianguaged", i.e. clothed in sounds potentially comprehensible to others. At the Civil Level,
"correct and incorrect" is a more appropriate dualism than "right and wrong". What is in-
volved is a balancing between inherited notions of appropriateness. At the Third Level,
"right and wrong" strives towards absolute truths in extreme cases, and towards lucid differ-
entiation between a positive and a negative condition. The notion of "justice", when consid-
ered at the Structural Level, imitates mathematics and becomes a matter of weights and
measures. At the Civil Level, terms like propriety, fairness, honour and cultured behaviour
are more applicable. No terms besides emotive ones expressing freedom seem appropriate
at the Anarchic Level.
"Freedom of expression" at the Anarchic Level merely denotes the state of being unhin-
dered by others. Freedom at the Second Level is a freedom to associate with others, a right
to take part in social games. At the Structural Level, Freedom becomes the right to follow
the conclusions of one's inductive and deductive powers.
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At the Anarchic Level, independence would mark of The Free Individual. At the Civil Level,
tolerance would characterise The Cultivated Person; while at the Structural Level, inductive
and deductive ability would be the skill of The Rational Person. The free person would
consider the rational person abstract and the cultivated person weak, the cultivated person
would dislike the free person for being irresponsible and egoistic and the rational person for
being stiff and possibly inhumane, while the rational person would probably call the culti-
vated person diffuse and vague and the free person primitive.
These are but a few examples of how a single term can be viewed as three essentially
different notions through the use of the Three Levels of Language Use. Seeing essentially
three meanings to every central term, based on the divisions of language use, will discour-
age a search for one essential meaning to every abstraction.
Now, since we consider human existence to occupy three spheres of language use, it is
suggested that the ideal situation is for an individual to be capable at all three levels. How-
ever, this will not be the case in the majority of cases. One would expect someone not well
trained at any of the levels to develop techniques to handle that weakness. I can think of two
ways this can be done. First, there is the avoidance of situations where unmastered lan-
guage levels come into play. This is a common enough strategy. Second, language and
behaviour belonging to the mastered level can be used to serve, however Clumsily, at some
unmastered level. This must prove insufficient and must lead to misunderstandings. For
example, what is considered hooliganism may be understood as Anarchic Level behaviour
being pressed into service at the Civil Level.
It might be helpful, for those who know the languages, to qualify the terminology with Malay
and Chinese terms. The Anarchic, the Civil and the Structural may be respectively be termed
nafsu (passion), adat (customs) and akal (reason) in Malay, or qi (energy), Ii (rituals) and fa
(law) in Chinese. Within Chinese philosophical traditions, the three main schools of thought
were Legalism, Confucianism and Daoism. The first believed that peace was only possible
if all obeyed legislative principles of behaviour where punishments were comprehensive
and predictable. Confucians, on the other hand, and in contradistinction to the legalists,
were generally convinced that ritualised behaviour in the widest sense of the term gener-
ated magnanimity in the human heart, and so the only way in which harmony could be
attained was through the cultivation of the human spirit. The Daoists opposed all such com-
plexities and preferred a life both simple and spontaneous (Graham, 1989; Creel, 1954).
These three modes of thought, interestingly, show a respective correlation to each of the
three spheres of human existence expressed through the levels of language use. The Daoist
seeks to develop his own qi and to express his natural state through unhampered energy
flow, the Confucian loves social training and his art is to perfect social behaviour, while the
legalist reduces social life into a function of the stable state.
Interestingly, while the Chinese word fa is generally translated either as "method" or "law", a
similar distinction is captured by the two commonly used Malay philosophical terms, akal
(reason) and hukum (law). While the latter deals with laws and sanctions, the former is more
generic in that denotes application of some mode of reasoning, be it philosophical, reli-
gious, ideological, pragmatic, utilitarian, logical or mathematical.
Upbringing and Language Learning
Some points about upbringing are given salience by the model. The learning of language
and the contexts in which the process occurs come in stages. In place of the stages in
Freudian psychology, one could substitute the Anarchic stage of language learning, the
Anarchic-Civil stage of language learning, the Civil stage of Anarchic learning, the Civil-
Structural stage of language learning and finally, the Structural stage of language learning.
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One further thing to keep in mind is that skills learned are not learned forever or at least that
all skills grow dull and must every now and then be sharpened. This makes it necessary for
the individual to sustain a balance between his different language abilities throughout the
course of his life.
The model gives support to the standpoint that one can be too hasty in teaching abstrac-
tions and complicated discourses to a child. A balance has probably to be kept between
"feelings seeking expression", and "expressions seeking feelings". Overly abstract teaching
techniques might disturb a child's language development from the Anarchic Level through
the Civil Level to the Structural Level, and possibly successively alienate him from his lan-
guage.
The method suggested by the model is that a child should as far as possible learn appropri-
ate language within the actual existential contexts that give the words and phrases mean-
ing. I venture that there is imbalance when a child of three or four, for example, discusses
environmental problems. The phrasing may be correct, but there is the danger that the
child's language is being distanced from his experiencing. There is a time for each skill.
It is a common complaint against intellectuals, for example, that though able to deduce and
define very well, they are unable to express their innermost feelings, or be social. This could
very well be the price paid for becoming too good at only one level of language use. Keeping
a growing child balanced involves teaching him/her new language uses, but with as little
loss as possible to his lower level language use, and with as strong a connection as pos-
sible to the skills he has already acquired. There is then a direction in language learning.
The base, the anarchic level, must be strongly laid even as other levels are being built upon
it. In acquiring higher levels, however, there is a real danger that earlier skills are easily lost,
through lack of practice and through society's prejudice in favour of the higher levels.
The struggle between the three levels can lead to dramatic behaviour in that all aspects of
human life is subjected and made subordinate to the favoured level. When the Structural
Level is favoured, one effect could be a belief in the possibility of perfect knowledge through
the creation, or discovery, of a perfect language that nullifies separated fields of human
existence (Russell, 1980,1912). When the Civil Level is favoured, religious cults and rituals
whose social contents are all encompassing, will encourage collective spontaneity or mor-
als (Kropotkin, 1914; Ridley, 1997). If skills from these two levels are instead refuted in
favour of the Anarchic Level, a worship of the immediate, the physical and the concrete
might take over. One may have the quietism of the Daoist, or the vehement and uncompro-
mising egoism of Max Stirner (Stirner, 1845, 1982).
The Anarchic Level is where the individual being experiences his/her own abilities. The Civil
Level is where humans meet, and it is there that love and hate occur. Power and knowledge
belong at the Structural Level. One may then expect a tension between which level should
have priority in giving meaning to words, and to life. The Structural Level may favour mean-
ing informed by some essentialism, as in the case of revealed religions and ideologies,
while the Civil Level may define existential meaning through ethics. The Anarchic Level may
claim that interaction of wills defines meaning. One good only at the First Level tends to see
will, or energy, forming the world. One most comfortable at the Civic Level will probably see
propriety and morality as the fibre of existence. The structurally able tends to objectify and,
like the scientific method that is its most advanced form, minimise subjective experience.
Moving from the Anarchic Level upward across the Civil Level to the Structural Level, there
is a change from Subject-orientation to Object-orientation.
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What is the picture like when someone is good at only two of the three levels? Let us
consider this further. One who is good at the first two levels, that is to say, one who is
handicapped at the third level, not mastering subjectless thought, may value duties. One
lacking Civil Level skills, and not feeling at home with flexible meanings, may value rights
and justice. The person good only at the second and third levels, not being able to com-
mand physical presence, may value truth seeking.
What of the person unskilled at all levels? What of him/her who has mastered all three
levels? We may technically call the first an idiot and the second a sage, with most of the rest
of us inhabiting the space in between. Our "ontological security", i.e. our feeling of feeling at
home in our daily life, is thus a function of our ability, or our lack of it, to manage in all three
spheres (Laing, 1961, p. 51).
Conclusions
Through dividing language use into three dynamically connected stages, it is hoped that
new ways of studying socio-psychological and socio-political phenomena can be evolved.
For example, a direct connection can easily be made between the three levels of language
use and the three different political philosophies of traditional China: Legalism, Confucian-
ism and Daoism. Schematically, this can be presented in the following fashion:
The Legalist State
The Ritual State
The Anarchist State
Model 2: A, 8 and C: Three Ideal States
Model 2A represents a legalistic system where rule of law has priority over order through
conventions and where anarchic expressions are not encouraged. Model 28, the Confucian
view, has conventions as the mainstay of a civilised and humane society, while the Daoistic
preference for spontaneity and simplicity is marked by an avoidance of central control.
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This article, having the individual as physical being as the starting point, claims that lan-
guage, though definitely social in origin and content, functions very differently in three spheres
of existence. The learner and user of language possesses raw physical power which lan-
guage and social rituals reform into civilised behaviour. However, this evolution cannot be
complete, which means that language use, moving from the physical being to the socialised
personality, expands from expressions that have little social content to discourses compre-
hensible to ever-larger groups of individuals. With the appearance of writing, thought was
no longer limited by rituals and the availability of dialogue partners. One could now think
alone, with the help of pen and paper or similar tools. The awe that this new discovery had
historically is testified to by the religious contexts within which they developed.
Thus, most of us humans today live in societies structured by three spheres of language
use, which he/she would do well to master. Admittedly, there is a bias here that it is prefer-
able for a person to master all three skills than to be comfortable only in one or two of these
spheres. Since we do live in a world where writing is ubiquitous, and since sociability is
normally considered a desirable trait, and since we usually consider spontaneous behaviour
liberating, I do not consider this preference too esoteric or unreasonable.
The crucial question asked, to which this article is a tentative answer, is really this: What are
the mechanisms involved in forming a person at home in himself, in his society and in the
universe?
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